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Economics is reputed to be the dismal science.1 In that spirit, this essay 
will focus on a fundamental dilemma for taxation that I anticipate will 
be generated by future progress in artificial intelligence. 
 
In 1983, Economics Nobel Laureate Wassily Leontief posited:  
 
“The role of humans as the most important factor of 
production is bound to diminish—in the same way that the role 
of horses in agricultural production was first diminished and 
then eliminated by the introduction of tractors.”2 
 
Leontief expressed a concern that has become increasingly common in 
recent years – that technological progress may make human labor 
redundant. 
 
The associated dilemma is that labor represents the most important 
source of income for individual human beings on the one hand and tax 
revenue for the government on the other hand. If the predictions made 
by Leontief, and in recent years by an increasing number of 
technologists, come true, then a large number of people, and perhaps 
all humans, will lose their jobs to technology at some point in the 
future.3 If we do not want to let them suffer the natural fate of hunger 
and starvation, governments around the world will have a much 
greater need for tax revenue. Yet, at the same time, the most important 
source of tax revenue is the taxation of labor, which will no longer be 





1 Robert Dixon, The Origin of the Term “Dismal Science” to Describe Economics, 1999 
UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 715. 
2 Wassily Leontief, National Perspective: The Definition of Problem and Opportunity, in THE 
LONG-TERM IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 3-4 (Nat’l Acd. 
Press 1983). 
3 NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES (Oxford Univ. Press 1st 
ed. 2014). 
4 CENT. ON BUDGET &POLICY PRIORITIES, Where Do Federal Tax Revenues Come From? 
(Sept. 28, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-where-do-federal-
tax-revenues-come-from [https://perma.cc/SD33-NMTF].  
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fundamental dilemma of taxation in the Age of AI is that as the need 
for taxation rises, the ease of taxation declines. 
 
In the following sections, I will start by discussing in more detail what 
it means for human labor to become economically redundant. Then I 
will describe how economic theories of taxation need to be updated if 
we move towards a world in which labor becomes redundant. Finally, 
I will analyze what we should levy taxes on if the taxation of labor is 
no longer an option. 
 
II. A Thought Experiment: The Vanishing Labor Market 
 
To better understand the critical problem of a contracting labor market, 
it is useful to focus on an extreme scenario: what should the 
government tax in a world where human labor has become completely 
redundant? For our purposes here, let us define human labor as 
“redundant” when the marginal product of human labor, i.e. the 
additional output that an additional worker would produce, is below 
the human subsistence level, i.e. below the cost of human upkeep – the 
cost of the food, shelter, and medicine that a worker requires to 
survive.5 To be more specific, if a human needs to eat at least 1500 
kcal/day to stay alive, but the value of labor–even for the most 
educated humans – is only enough to afford a 500 kcal/day diet, then 
human labor is redundant according to our definition. Some may say 
that even in a world where labor is dominated by AI, (i.e. in which AI 
can do everything better than humans can) people could still pose as 
statues in the homes of Jeff Bezos or Mark Zuckerberg. However, 
given the low economic value that such activities generate, the 
associated market wage may well be below the cost of human upkeep. 
 
At the time of writing in 2019, human labor is clearly not redundant – 





5 ANTON KORINEK & JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, Artificial Intelligence and Its Implications for 
Income Distribution and Unemployment, in THE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: AN 
AGENDA 349 (Ajay Agrawal et. al. eds., 2019). 
6 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE 
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last visited Oct 
10, 2019). 
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However, our scenario is useful to consider because it is the direction 
in which technological progress seems to be moving. Furthermore, 
some subgroups of the population may already be technologically 
redundant – leading, for example, to widespread “deaths of despair.”7 
Furthermore, current progress in AI is starting to affect workers on the 
higher rungs of the skill distribution.8 And a majority of experts 
predict human-level general intelligence that can substitute for any 
tasks performed by humans may only be a few decades away.9 
 
If we arrive at a world in which labor markets simply vanish, what are 
the choices faced by society? There is a wide range of options to deal 
with this hypothetical scenario, covering a continuum of policy 
choices. On one end of this continuum, some suggest the government 
could tax most or all of the income generated by AI and robots and 
distribute it, ushering in an egalitarian utopia – an era of 
unprecedented shared human prosperity.10 In this case, the question of 
how to tax the income generated in order to distribute it across society 
is most urgent. On the other end of the continuum is a rather dystopian 
scenario where humans are left to fend for themselves and will suffer 
and starve when they can no longer earn their upkeep. In that case, 
raising taxes would not be particularly important. There is a wide 
range of options in between these two extremes, and we as a society, 
whether it is through an intentional political process or through 
random historical accident, will determine where we end up.  
 
Whereas the question we just posed concerned society’s choices for 
the future, recent history provides us with examples of how society has 





7 Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Rising Morbidity and Mortality in Midlife among White Non-
Hispanic Americans in the 21st Century, 112 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 5078, 5078 
(2015). 
8 David Deming, AI and Robots are Displacing Science and Tech Workers. The Question is: 
How Quickly?, PBS: News Hour (Sept. 28, 2019, 3:56 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/ 
economy/making-sense/ai-and-robots-are-displacing-science-and-tech-jobs-the-question-is-
how-quickly [https://perma.cc/C7PB-84NE.] 
9 BOSTROM, supra note 3, at 19. 
10 Scott A. Wolla, Will Robots Take Our Jobs?, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS: PAGE ONE ECON. 
(JAN. 2018), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/page1-econ/2018/01/02/will-robots-
take-our-jobs# [https://perma.cc/HN4L-2TFN]. 
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picture is not particularly encouraging. For instance, in the past four 
decades, unskilled labor in the U.S. lost out not only in relative terms, 
but also in absolute terms.11 An unskilled worker today actually has 
lower real income than 40 years ago.12 An idealist would expect that 
governmental programs would, in response, support those workers 
who have lost ground due to technological progress. But in fact, over 
the past four decades, as labor has been devalued economically, 
political forces have reinforced the downward trend for unskilled 
worker: our tax system has become less progressive,13 and distributive 
policies have become less generous and have made it harder for 
unskilled workers to make a living on their income.14 These facts are 
evidence that historically, our society has not been very good at 
countering adverse effects of technological change on workers. 
 
III. Updating Economic Views on Optimal Taxation 
 
One of the main questions in public economics is how we should best 
design tax systems in order to raise the tax revenue required to meet 
society’s public spending objectives. I will argue that economists’ 
framework for designing tax systems will require some fundamental 
rethinking in the Age of AI. In particular, if AI progressively devalues 
human labor, I will show that there are strong economic efficiency 
reasons to stop taxing human labor, even before labor is fully 
redundant. 
 
The two main economic factors when designing a tax system are, on 
the one hand, minimizing efficiency losses and, on the other hand, 
achieving a desirable distribution of income. 15 Taxes are efficient if 
they minimize the distortions that they create, for example by 





11 ANTON KORINEK, LABOR IN THE AGE OF AUTOMATION AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 
ECONOMISTS FOR INCLUSIVE PROSPERITY 2-3 (Jan. 2019), https://econfip.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/6.Labor-in-the-Age-of-Automation-and-Artificial-Intelligence.pdf. 
12 Id. at 1. 
13 Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, How Progressive is the U.S. Federal Tax System? A 
Historical and International Perspective, 21 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 3 (2007). 
14 Marianne P. Bitler & Hilary W. Hoynes, The State of the Social Safety Net in the Post-
Welfare Reform Era, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 71 (2010). 
15 ANTHONY ATKESON & JOSEPH STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 7 (1980). 
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of distribution, the objective is to generate a distribution of resources 
among members of society that is in line with society’s preferences on 
inequality, for example by imposing a larger tax burden on those who 
can afford to pay more. Depending on one’s political preferences that 
may mean flat taxes that affect everyone equally, or it may mean tax 
rates in excess of 80% on billionaires, as suggested by the French 
economist Thomas Piketty.16 The two objectives of maximizing 
efficiency and obtaining an equitable distribution of resources are 
frequently in conflict with each other.   
 
a. The Economics of Capital Taxation 
 
One of the most surprising, and simultaneously most instructive, 
theorems in the economics of optimal taxation is that it is optimal not 
to impose any taxes on capital in the long-run, no matter if we care 
mostly about efficiency or mostly about inequality.17,18 Like every 
economic theorem, the result rests on assumptions that are never fully 
satisfied in practice, but there are nonetheless important lessons to 
learn from it.19 The intuition behind the result is that capital is an 
intermediate good. Capital is not something we directly consume, but 
it is used to produce future consumption goods. If the government 
taxes capital, it discourages its accumulation, leads to a decline in the 
capital stock, and makes the production of consumption goods more 
difficult. Consequently, the government should not tax capital, the 
intermediate good, in the long run – this would ultimately just make 
everybody worse off, including the workers that the taxes are supposed 
to support. Instead, the standard theory of optimal taxation suggests 
that the government should tax either consumption or people's labor 






16 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 512-13 (Arthur Goldhammer 
trans., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2014). 
17 CHRISTOPHE CHAMLEY, Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with 
Infinite Lives, 54 ECONOMETRICA 607, 607 (1986). 
18 KENNETH L. JUDD, Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model, 28 J. 
PUBLIC ECON. 59, 81 (1985). 
19 See Ludwig Straub & Ivan Werning, Positive Long Run Capital Taxation: Chamley-Judd 
Revisited, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20441, 2014). 
20 See ATKESON & STIGLITZ, supra note 15, at X. 




b. Lessons from Capital Taxation for Labor Taxation in 
the Age of AI 
 
However, recent advances in AI surprisingly suggest that we should 
apply the same logic to the taxation of labor (i.e. that it is desirable not 
to impose taxes on labor), as I will elaborate in the following.   
 
In the past few centuries, in the period after the Industrial Revolution, 
the economy produced so much surplus that the vast majority of 
workers in advanced countries lived above subsistence levels—i.e. 
their income was well above what is needed to cover their basic human 
needs and survive.21 During that period, taxes on labor had some 
effects on an individual’s decision to supply labor in the market, but 
they had little effect on overall population numbers and therefore on 
the supply of human bodies to the economy.22 Standard economic 
prescriptions about the taxation of labor are, naturally, based on this 
world. 
 
Before the Industrial Revolution, by contrast, humanity lived in a 
Malthusian world. Malthus’ critical insight was that throughout much 
of the history of humanity, any economic growth, whether it stemmed 
from the discovery of new lands or of new methods of production, led 
to a proportionate increase in the size of the human population, so that 
the individual human was back at subsistence levels after the 
population adjustment.23 This was a dismal perspective, since, from 
the perspective of individual well-being, there was no scope for 
permanent increases in economic well-being.  
 
In a Malthusian world, taxes on human labor reduce take-home 
incomes below subsistence levels (unless, of course, they are 





21 CLARK NARDINELLI, Industrial Revolution of the Standard of Living, THE LIBR. OF ECON. 
AND LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/IndustrialRevolutionandtheStandard 
ofLiving.html [https:/perma.cc/YNF6-9S84]. 
22 Id. 
23 THOMAS MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION 6 (Elec. Scholarly Publ’g 
Project 1998) (1798), http://www.esp.org/books/malthus/population/malthus.pdf. 
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case they do not generate net revenue).24 This leads to starvation and 
an associated decline in the human population, up to the point where 
the available resources, after the tax, are sufficient so that the average 
human obtains a subsistence income yet again.25 In other words, in a 
Malthusian world, changes in income-net-of-taxes lead to 
proportionate changes in the size of the human population and in the 
supply of bodies to the economy. 
 
The reason why humanity escaped this Malthusian world–with the 
advent of the Industrial Revolution–was that rapid economic progress 
lifted incomes so fast that population growth could not keep up with 
economic growth.26 This happened because progress was roughly what 
economists call Hicks-neutral, meaning the fruits of economic 
progress were distributed equally between labor and capital. By 
contrast, if future progress in AI is no longer Hicks-neutral but instead 
labor-replacing, it may well generate significant declines in human 
wages. In the limit, this may bring us back to a world where 
Malthusian dynamics apply to wage earners.27 In that case, our results 
for labor taxation in a Malthusian world would apply yet again. 
Notice the close analogy between the well-known economic theorem 
on optimal capital taxation and our new results on optimal labor 
taxation in a Malthusian world: both capital and labor are factors that 
are expensive to create and maintain. Capital requires economic 
resources that are used for maintenance and reinvestment. Labor 
requires economic resources that are used for maintenance and upkeep. 
In other words, one of the reasons we pay workers is so that they can 
maintain themselves and provide labor to the economy. Taxing capital 
discourages the accumulation of capital and ultimately hurts everyone, 





24 Id. at 8-9.      
25 Id. 
26 GREGORY CLARK, A FAREWELL TO ALMS: A BRIEF ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE WORLD 
(Princeton Univ. Press 2007). 
27 See Anton Korinek, The Rise of Artificially Intelligent Agents (Sept. 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://www.korinek.com/download/AIAs.pdf. 
28 Chris Edwards, Taxing Wealth and Capital Income, 85 CATO INSTITUTE: TAX & BUDGET 
BULLETIN 1, 8-10 (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/tbb85 
_final_edit.pdf. 
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workers and ultimately hurts everyone, including the capitalists.29 In a 
way, both capital and labor can be viewed as intermediate goods to 
produce final output, and it would be grossly inefficient to tax either.  
 
Our line of reasoning is, of course, built on strong assumptions about 
the effects of future progress in AI on labor markets, but it serves to 
highlight a stark economic force that may make it increasingly 
undesirable to impose significant taxes on labor, for pure efficiency 
reasons–even if we did not care about an equitable distribution of 
incomes. 
 
IV. Alternative Sources of Tax Revenue 
 
What else can and should be taxed if neither labor nor capital can 
serve as an efficient source of tax revenue?  
 
Let me first observe that an ideal target for taxation is externalities, on 
which we can levy Pigouvian taxes and collect revenue while 
simultaneously increasing economic efficiency. Pigouvian taxes are 
named after the famous economist Arthur C. Pigou who emphasized, 
almost a century ago, that when there are negative externalities, taxing 
those externalities simultaneously makes the market allocation more 
efficient and raises tax revenue.30 Society can employ the resulting tax 
revenue in any way it desires. Under Pigouvian taxation, there is thus 
no conflict between the two goals of efficiency and equitable 
distribution.31 A simple example is the case of environmental 
externalities, such as pollution. The fundamental problem of negative 
externalities is that they impose costs on society that their creators do 
not internalize–the polluter reaps the benefits of an economic activity 
whereas all of society suffers from the effects of pollution.32 However, 
if polluters are charged a tax that reflects precisely the costs that their 
pollution imposes on society, then the tax corrects the incentives to 





29 Id.       
30 See generally ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1932). 
31 Id. 
32 Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J. L. & ECON. 141, 151 (1979). 
2020] KORINEK 253 
 
 
while simultaneously raising revenue. As the labor share of income in 
the economy declines, the share earned by natural resources and, 
hence, the potential for Pigouvian taxation, may in fact rise. 
 
Another way to identify promising candidates for taxation in the Age 
of AI is to observe an important insight from economics: technological 
progress is overall a positive sum game. Whenever one factor of 
production, for example labor, experiences losses as a result of new 
technology, the positive-sum nature of technological progress implies 
that there must be other factors of production that are gaining more 
than what labor has lost. When considering how to raise tax revenue 
when the value of labor declines, it is thus natural to look for the 
winners of technological progress. To put it succinctly, when adjusting 
our tax system for a post-labor world, we should follow where the 
money is going. In that spirit, let me discuss three specific winners 
from technological progress. 
 
The first example are the owners of fixed factors, such as land and 
certain natural resources. For instance, returns to land, particularly in 
crowded metropolitan areas such as Silicon Valley and New York 
City, have skyrocketed in recent decades because technological 
progress has made the land in these areas more valuable. This makes 
them a natural candidate to tax. An additional benefit of taxing fixed 
factors like land is that taxes on such factors cannot distort incentives 
to supply the factor. For example, if the government taxes land, the tax 
is unlikely to change people's incentives to produce more land–land is 
simply fixed (with minor exceptions like New York City and 
Singapore where people deploy resources to create land). However, it 
is important to emphasize that a property tax on the structures built 
upon land would distort incentives to build structures such as 
housing.33 
 
The second example of a factor that has really gained from 
technological progress is skilled labor. This example is very relevant 





33 Jeffrey P. Cohen & Cletus C. Coughlin, An Introduction to Two-Rate Taxation of Land 
Buildings, 87 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS 359, 360 (2005). 
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skilled workers may be made redundant by technological advances. In 
recent decades, highly-skilled workers have gained to a large extent 
because technology has increasingly favored skilled over unskilled 
workers–the economy has had greater use for skill than it used to.34 
This has made skilled labor a good target for taxation.  
 
Taxing the winners of technological progress, such as land or skilled 
labor, naturally presents the political economy problem that the 
winners do not like to give up their gains. Whereas the losers of 
technological progress like to argue that they are the victims of 
broader external forces, the winners of progress like to argue that all 
their gains are well-earned by their efforts and hard work. This may be 
true to some extent–the winners may have, for example, done more 
extensive research on which factors will gain and which factors will 
lose. This type of research would be disincentivized if the prospective 
winners anticipate that their gains will be taxed away, reducing, for 
example, incentives to invest in the right types of human capital. 
However, there is also always an important element of chance in 
determining which technological changes occur and how they affect 
the distribution of income, justifying at least some taxation on the 
winners of progress. 
 
The third example of a “factor” that has gained significantly in recent 
decades is monopoly power. Monopoly rents have seen a large rise in 
their share of income in the US, in part, at the expense of labor.35 At 
times, monopoly rents can be taxed without introducing economic 
distortions in the economy since they are pure rents. However, there is 
also an important qualification to this observation, which arises when 
monopoly rents are used to cover fixed costs such as research and 







34 LAWRENCE KATZ & KEVIN MURPHY, Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and 
Demand Factors, 107 Q. J. ECON. 35, 54 (1992). 
35 Jan De Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic 
Implications (NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, WORKING PAPER No. 23687, 2017), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23687.pdf. 
2020] KORINEK 255 
 
 
V. Digitization and Rents in an Information Economy  
 
The last case I would like to discuss is the taxation of the digital 
economy. This requires that we observe that information goods differ 
fundamentally from more traditional goods in the economy: they are 
non-rivalrous, which carries crucial implications for market structure 
and taxation.36 If a good is rivalrous, it can be used only by one person 
at a time, like for example a chair. By contrast, information can be 
used by many people at once without being diminished. In fact, 
everybody around the world can use a given piece of information 
without diminishing it.   
 
Even though information is non-rivalrous, however, it is potentially 
excludable, and intellectual property law has made the use of many 
information goods legally excludable. Intellectual property rights 
allow the creators or owners of information goods to exclude others 
from using them. As a result, the owners of information have 
monopoly power in the economic sense of the word, which gives them 
the ability to extract information rents.  
 
This ability to collect information rents in turn carries both positive 
and negative implications. The positive side is that the information 
rents provide incentives for the creation of information goods and 
allow their creators to cover the costs of producing them. Many 
information goods (e.g., software) require large upfront fixed costs. It 
would be impossible to finance the creation of information goods in a 
perfectly competitive market, since such a market would always pay 
the marginal cost of providing the goods to an additional person, 
which is close to zero–the marginal cost curve is below the average 
cost curve for any quantity produced. Information goods are thus 
fundamentally incompatible with efficient markets in the traditional 







36 ANTON KORINEK & DING XUAN NG, DIGITIZATION AND THE MACRO-ECONOMICS OF 
SUPERSTARS (University of Virginia 2018). 
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The downside of monopoly power over information goods, however, 
is that the associated monopoly rents inefficiently limit the use of the 
information goods. Since private companies need to charge for the 
information goods even though the marginal cost of the goods is zero, 
their distribution is inefficiently limited. In many cases, the monopoly 
rents earned by companies in the information economy are arguably in 
large excess of the costs of producing the information goods. The 
resulting rents are then clear targets for taxation. Potential inventors 
continue to have incentives to work on their inventions as long as they 
can expect to make profits after subtracting the costs of creating 
information goods and any taxes. If information rents stem from 
intellectual property rights, then an alternative strategy to taxation to 
reduce any excess rents on information goods is to weaken IP rights.37 
 
VI. Application To Robot Taxation 
 
Consider the taxation of rents in one specific context: the taxation of 
robots. A significant part of the value of robots is comprised of their 
design and programming, both of which are information goods and are 
non-rivalrous. As a consequence, the observations above about the 
taxation of information goods apply to this part of robots. By contrast, 
the physical vessel of the robot constitutes physical capital in the 
traditional sense, and our earlier discussion on the desirability not to 
tax capital applies to that part. In summary, we should refrain from 
taxing the robot as a physical vessel but should tax the design of the 
robot and the programs that are running on it because those are 
information goods that generate rents.   
VII. Conclusion 
 
A final point observation is that the direction of technological progress 
is not just driven by blind technological forces but is a societal choice 





37 Korinek & Stiglitz, supra note 5, at 352. 
38 See generally Anton Korinek, Integrating Ethical Values and Economic Value to Steer 
Progress in Artificial Intelligence, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE ETHICS OF AI (Markus D. 
Dubber et. al. eds., 2019). 
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Advances in AI can be directed in two different directions: AI can be 
advanced such that it replaces workers, or AI can be advanced such 
that it empowers workers and makes them more productive. Currently, 
high labor taxes encourage entrepreneurs to develop labor-replacing 
AI rather than labor-enhancing AI. This is accelerating the arrival of a 
time when labor will be largely displaced. 
 
In summary, from this particular economist’s perspective, advances in 
AI should make governments more and more cautious about 
continuing to impose significant tax burdens on labor. They should 
also be cautious about taxing physical capital (with emphasis on the 
qualifier physical). However governments should and probably will 
have to increasingly focus on taxing fixed factors, externalities and 
rents, especially in the context of monopolies 
